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Retraction Statements and Research Malpractice in Economics 
Abstract 
 
Based on an analysis of 55 articles retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in the 
field of economics, we highlight the frequency, nature and pattern of research 
malpractice in economics. To illuminate the incentives and disincentives for research 
malpractice, and drawing on rational crime theory, we pay particular attention to “no 
reason” retractions and the policy guidelines of publishers regarding retracted 
papers. We conclude that the vagueness of retraction statements, and a general 
reluctance to signal research malpractice, generally results in little damage to the 
reputation of caught and known offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to engaging in 
research malpractice is lacking. To reduce the incidence of research malpractice, we 
offer several recommendations for publishers and journal editors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Growing concern about the substantial scale of research misconduct (Martin, 
2013) has pointed to the need for additional empirical evidence regarding 
questionable research practices (henceforth, QRPs) in all disciplines. Biagioli and 
Kenney (2016, p.1944), for example, have called for more information regarding 
forms of “traditional misconduct – fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism 
…[and]… new misconduct … fake peer reviews and citation rings.” 
There is clear evidence that academic economists engage in QRPs (Necker, 
2014; Wible, 2016). Studies by Karabag and Berggren (2012; 2016) have analysed 
QRPs in 6 and 43 retracted papers in economics, respectively. However, knowledge 
of the frequency, nature and pattern of research malpractice within the discipline 
remains rudimentary. To address this lack of knowledge, we analyse 55 articles 
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that have been retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. This is the 
largest evidential base of retractions assembled to date in the field of economics.  
Despite the limitations of all such exercises, we concur with Fanelli (2013, p.1) 
that it is more than likely the statistics so obtained “are proportional not to the 
prevalence of misconduct but to the efficiency of the system that detects it.” Given 
the secretive and often shameful nature of research malpractice, we accept that it 
is unlikely we will ever obtain a full picture of its prevalence. Therefore, we do not 
suggest that an increasing level of retractions can be equated with an actual rise 
in research malpractice. Rather, an increase in the level of retractions seems likely 
to be due to increased vigilance on the part of editors, publishers, reviewers and 
readers. Mindful of these caveats, we contend that the data provided here offer 
valuable insight to the forms of malpractice that occur, even if the full extent is not 
fully documented. Our analysis raises important issues about the high incidence 
of “no reason” retractions in economics journals. 
We make three important contributions. First, we highlight the forms of 
malpractice that drive retractions in peer-reviewed journals in economics. In doing 
so, we provide indicative data regarding the frequency and nature of research 
malpractice in economics. We also explore the incentives that prompt (allegedly) 
“rational” researchers in economics to use QRPs, and suggest ways of eliminating 
those incentives to improve the integrity of research. Second, we recommend 
actions that publishers and journal editors should take to deal more effectively 
with research malpractice. Specifically, we highlight the incidence of “no reason” 
retractions, review the publishers’ guidelines on retraction, and offer proposals to 
reduce the frequency with which journals retract papers without stating a clear 
reason. Third, we propose a global protocol for dealing with retracted papers. 
We illuminate the incentives for research malpractice in order to aid 
identification of possible remedies. We conclude that the vagueness of retraction 
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statements, and a general reluctance to signal research malpractice, often results 
in little damage to the reputation of known offenders. Thus, a key deterrent to 
partaking in research malpractice is lacking. Moreover, deterrents are constrained 
by the limited resources applied to detection. It is not sufficient to rely on the 
goodwill and discretionary time of editors and reviewers to assess academic 
research content. This is particularly the case because the incentive structures that 
influence journal editors are also unhelpful: editors are likely to be concerned that 
any signalling of research malpractice will damage the reputation of their journals. 
Thus journal editors and publishers have incentives not to offer clear signals 
regarding the prospect that QRPs appear in papers they publish.  
The present exploration of research malpractice in economics analyses articles 
retracted from economics journals ranked in journal lists issued by the U.K.’s 
Chartered Association of Business Schools (ABS) and the Australian Business 
Deans’ Council (ABDC). Both of these lists are widely used beyond the UK and 
Australia, particularly in countries where formal assessments of research quality 
occur. Despite much criticism that such ranking lists distort research by 
prioritising the status of publishing journals above the content of the articles they 
publish (Tourish and Willmott, 2015), these lists are much favoured by university 
managements because of their convenience and “auditability.”  
We begin by reviewing existing evidence of research malpractice in economics, 
before describing the research methods employed. Then, we present findings, 
discuss how retracted papers are dealt with by journals, and highlight the need to 
examine the corpus of publications of authors of retracted papers. We conclude by 
offering recommendations to editors and publishers to improve current practices in 
respect of retracted papers. 
 
2. Literature Review 
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Here we begin by reviewing studies of cost/benefit incentives in the context of 
research malpractice. We then clarify the meaning of “research malpractice” before 
reviewing prior studies of research malpractice in economics. 
Our analysis of researcher engagement in QRPs is informed by traditional 
economic behaviour theory. We assume that individuals will seek to maximise their 
private gain whenever they can. In particular, we follow an “economics of rational 
crime” framework, stemming from Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1974, 1996). Becker 
(1968) theorized that crime was an important economic activity. He drew parallels 
between the behavioural relations of all parties to criminal activity, and those that 
occur in a normal commodity market. Thus, in invoking an “economics or rational 
crime” framework, we consider the behavioural relations that exist between 
perpetrators of crime, victims of crime, and those attempting to stop crime.  
QRPs should not be equated axiomatically with criminal activity. Rather, QRPs 
inhabit a grey zone between what is mildly harmful and what is unequivocally 
criminal (e.g., using research grants to conduct research that is not the subject of 
the funding application). Nevertheless, the focus of rational crime theory on the 
costs and benefits of committing crime helps in understanding the factors that 
encourage QRPs within academia. 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1974, 1996) contend that the decisions of a potential 
criminal follow a rational economic choice: that is, a rational individual will weigh 
the perceived benefits of a decision to commit a crime against the perceived costs 
involved. Thus, an individual will commit a crime if the private returns s/he expects 
outweigh the costs (e.g., the opportunity costs of using time or other resources to 
undertake legitimate paid work, and the punishment if apprehended). The cost to 
an individual of committing a crime includes the resources used evading 
apprehension, the punishment if convicted, the probability of being apprehended, 
the foregone wages, and the taste (or distaste) for crime (which includes the impact 
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on an individual’s moral values, predisposition towards crime, and risk preferences) 
(Ehrlich, 1996). The costs are greater when the punishment and the chances of 
apprehension are higher, when an individual has a higher moral objection or 
distaste towards crime, and when an individual is more risk adverse.  
The element Ehrlich (1996) noted as an individual’s “taste (or distaste) for crime” 
has been the subject of recent studies. Necker (2016) argues that relevant studies 
in the field of behavioural economics provide evidence that individuals pay greater 
attention to social considerations and moral values compared to the financial 
elements of the decision making process. Levitt and List (2007, p. 154) describe the 
moral value element of decision making as including the following five factors:  
1) the presence of moral and ethical considerations;  
2) the nature and extent of scrutiny of one’s actions by others;  
3) the context in which the decision is embedded;  
4) self-selection of the individuals making the decisions; and  
5) the stakes of the game.  
Thus, if the moral and social elements (of distaste for crime) are more important 
to an individual, then the compensating return or net payoff must exceed a larger 
threshold before the individual is interested in engaging in crime (Ehrlich, 1996). 
While this reduces the likelihood of people engaging in crime, it does not completely 
remove the pro-crime effects of incentives, since a distaste for crime is not evenly 
distributed among a given population.  
In the context of QRPs, Wible (2003) explained that a researcher will commit 
research fraud if the private benefits outweigh the costs of apprehension and 
punishment. In such a context, fraudulent and genuine research should not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive – researchers can choose an optimum mixture of 
fraudulent and genuine research activities to achieve the best outcome for 
themselves from use of their limited time and resources.  
Consistent with the theoretical lens just introduced, obvious benefits are 
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obtainable from research malpractice, including relief from the time and costs 
involved in data collection and analysis. Beyond that, Craig et al. (2014) highlight 
how a culture of routinely subjecting research outputs to performance audit has 
taken hold in universities which are determined to improve ranking positions in 
(inter)national league tables. One consequence is that academics are under more 
pressure than ever to publish in reputable journals. They are rewarded by universities 
through career progression and salary increases if they do so, but are often penalised 
if they do not (e.g., by being moved to teaching only contracts) (McNay, 2016).  
Offsetting the benefits of engaging in malpractice are the costs of doing so. These 
can be imputed as a combination of the probability of detection, the likely severity of 
punishment, and the perceived reputational damage to the perpetrator. Such 
theorising leads to the conclusion that the likelihood a researcher will engage in QRP’s 
is reduced by any increase in the probability of being caught, and in the penalty 
(including reputational damage) if caught (Wible, 2003; Collins et al., 2007). 
Thus, if rational academic economists consider the benefits they will accrue 
from engaging in research malpractice will outweigh the likely costs, at least some 
of them are likely to be tempted to engage in research malpractice (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978). Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) have argued that the chances of being caught 
are small because of the unobserved nature of some of the practices involved (e.g., 
fabrication of data or the gifting of authorship). They contend also that research 
malpractice is likely to be widespread and hard to detect in research fields (such as 
economics) that provide incremental advances, and have low or non-existent scrutiny 
of the authenticity of research data. Thus, there is ample encouragement for a 
rational researcher in economics to engage in research malpractice (Misangyi et al., 
2008; Pillay and Kluvers, 2014). 
In many fields (including economics) the cost of engaging in research fraud is 
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lowered by the reluctance of social science journals to publish replication studies.1 
In theory, replications can confirm the strength of a field or illustrate problems 
within it. Yet, many researchers report grave difficulty in publishing replications, 
particularly in journals where the original studies appeared (French, 2012). The 
infrequency of replication allows poorly supported or errant findings to remain 
undetected (Madden et al., 1995; Stroebe et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2012; Bakker et 
al., 2012; Denison et al., 2014). This acts to encourage those who are contemplating 
engaging in research malpractice.  
Replications of previously published studies are important in helping to 
preserve the integrity of the cumulative empirical foundation of knowledge (Eden, 
2002). Nevertheless, a study of 18 leading business journals, 1970-1991, found that 
replication papers constituted  
… less than 10% of published empirical work in the accounting, economics, 
and finance areas, and 5% or less in the management and marketing fields … 
[thus] empirical results in these areas may be of limited value for guiding the 
development of business theory and practice (Hubbard and Vetter, 1999, 
p.153).  
 
Hoover (2006) questioned the balance between the rewards and penalties for 
research malpractice in economics. He argued that it is rational for an author to 
engage in malpractice, given current incentives and problems of detection. For 
example, a plagiarist might be emboldened if s/he knew that the sole responsibility 
for confronting and exposing a plagiarist would fall to an original author or whistle-
blower, rather than an impartial sanctioning body. This is because of the high 
financial and emotional costs borne by an individual in pursuing, and exposing, a 
                                           
1 For example, in psychology, Martin and Clarke (2017) report that only 3 per cent of journals accept 
replication studies and that one third actively discourage them. 
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plagiarist.2 In view of this, it is not surprising that the scale of plagiarism is substantial 
and growing, even among senior researchers (Martin, 2013). 
 
What Constitutes Research Malpractice? 
 
Research malpractice includes: 
 fabrication (invention of data),  
 falsification (inaccurate presentation of research, including omission of 
inconvenient results),  
 plagiarism (inaccurate or unattributed use of someone else’s work) (Banks et 
al. 2016; Lewis et al., 2011),  
 self-plagiarism (recycling portions of an author’s own previous work without 
acknowledgment) (Bruton, 2014), and  
 financial misconduct (non-disclosure of financial interests in research and 
misuse of research funds) (Hiney, 2015).  
These are well-known practices. However, two further less well known practices are 
p-hacking and HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known). 
P-hacking involves such actions as “reporting only studies that deliver the 
desired p-value; terminating a study when a desired p-value has been reached; 
dropping items from survey instruments that prevent attainment of ‘desirable’ p-
values; and rounding off a p-value (for example, stating 0.054 as 0.05)” (Authors, 
                                           
2 An example is the case of Indiana University’s Professor of Management and Entrepreneurship, Mark 
Fox, who accused two colleagues (Douglas Agbetsiafa and Peter Aghimien) of plagiarism. According to 
the Retraction Watch website (http://retractionwatch.com/2017/02/06/whistleblower- gets-court-
backing-defamation-case-cost/#more-47863), Agbetsiafa (accused of plagiarism in 15 papers) was 
found guilty by an Indiana University investigation panel. Aghimien (a co-author of one paper) was 
cleared, but sued Fox for defamation in a blog written by Fox, for “intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.” Fox claims to have “spent tens of thousands of dollars on his legal defense.” He alleges that 
Indiana University’s “lack of support” for him was “disillusioning and demoralizing” and “does not send 
a healthy message to potential whistleblowers.” 
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20XX. See also Simmons et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Academy of Medical Sciences, 
2015). Chambers (2017) describes this as “the sin of hidden flexibility”, because how 
researchers actually analyse their data is deliberately reported selectively or kept 
secret from editors, reviewers and ultimately readers. This conduct often involves a 
form of “data torture” in which the data are interrogated mercilessly until they 
support a given hypothesis. Such an approach risks saturating the literature with 
false positives known as Type 1 errors (Starbuck, 2016), and “undead theories” that 
are used widely, but which are nevertheless unsound (Ferguson and Heene, 2012). 
HARKing involves presenting hypotheses as if they were developed a priori rather 
than ex-post — a practice often referred to as “data mining” in economics (for an 
example, see 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440760100077X. Authors 
(20XX) claim that HARKing exaggerates the predictive power of theories under study, 
improves researchers’ prospects of obtaining statistically significant results, leads to 
“the adoption of theories and practices that are assumed erroneously to have obtained 
solid scientific support,” and makes “the methods sections of many papers works of 
creative fiction rather than rigorous accounts of how (and in what sequence) research 
was conducted” (see also Schwab and Starbuck, 2016; Garud, 2015). 
 
Studies of Research Malpractice in Economics 
 
Table 1 summarises seven studies, published between 1986 and 2015, that have 
explored the incidence of QRPs in economics. The table reveals high levels of self-
admitted QRPs by academic economists: for example, Necker’s (2014) survey of 631 
European economists found that 24% reported self-plagiarising and 32% reported 
presenting empirical findings selectively to confirm an argument. 
  
 Table 1 
Studies of Questionable Research Practices in Economics 
 
        QRP  Authors Data Source Results  
QRPs 
generally 
Enders & Hoover 2004 127 editors of economics journals 70% are unlikely to report a case of plagiarism 
 Karabag & Berggren 
2012 
EBSCO Business Source Premier, 
Emerald, JSTOR, Science Direct journals 
6 articles retracted between 2008-2012 in economics journals lacking a 
QRP policy or failing to screen for QRPs 
 Karabag & Berggren 
2016 
 
Necker 2014 
EBSCO Business Source Premier, 
Emerald, JSTOR, Science Direct journals 
 
631 European economists 
43 articles retracted in economics journals between 2005 and 2015 
 
 
94% had engaged in at least one QRP 
 Yalcintas & Selcuk 
2015 
107 US and European economics 
departments 
69% do not offer research ethics training to junior researchers 
 
Data Fraud 
List et al. 2001 134 US economists 4% had falsified research data 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 3% had fabricated some data 
 
Plagiarism 
Enders & Hoover 2004 127 editors of economics journals 
24% had experienced plagiarism. Reported an average of 42 plagiarism 
cases per year 
 
Enders & Hoover 2006 
1208 US economists 24% report having been plagiarised 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 2% had copied from others without citing 
Self- 
plagiarism 
List et al. 2001 134 US economists 7–10% self-plagiarised or were guest/ghost authors 
 Necker 2014 631 European economists 24% self-reported they had self-plagiarised 
P-hacking 
Necker 2014 631 European economists 
32% had presented empirical findings selectively to confirm an 
argument 
HARKing* Necker 2014 631European economists 79% reported engaging in HARKing 
Guest 
authors 
Necker 2014 
List et al. 2001 
631 European economists 
134 US economists 
3% had accepted or offered gifts for authorship 
7-10% self-plagiaries or were guest/ghost authors 
Poor 
research 
records 
 
Dewald et al. 1986 
 
154 US authors of economics articles 
 
15% of data sets were accurately recorded and properly documented 
* HARKing = Hypothesising After the Results are Known 
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QRPs in economics arise despite many leading journals in the discipline stating 
explicitly that they adopt the guidelines of the Committee on Publication Ethics 
(COPE).3 Other leading journals in economics comply with the COPE guidelines 
(although this is unstated) in a form of implicit adoption. The “Retraction Guidelines” 
published by COPE are quite clear. They advise that retraction notices should state 
“who is retracting the article”; “the reason(s) for retraction (to distinguish misconduct 
from honest error)”; and should avoid retraction statements “that are potentially 
defamatory or libellous” statements.4 COPE also advises that “the main purpose of 
retractions is to correct the literature and ensure its integrity rather than punish 
authors who misbehave” 
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802086/).  
Nevertheless, editors seem to be wary of making retractions. The Retraction 
Watch website (http://retractionwatch.com/) has documented many cases of 
authors taking legal action to prevent retraction of their papers.5 The prospect of a 
disgruntled author suing a journal editor or publisher seems to partly explain the 
high incidence, reported below, of “no reason” retractions, and the general lack of 
transparency in other retraction notices. The vulnerability of editors to litigation 
diminishes the prospect of exposing all erring authors. 
 
                                           
3 Those making such a statement include, for example, The RAND Journal of Economics and The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 
4 Similar policies on retraction are published by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors 
(ICMJE) which states that “The text of the retraction should explain why the article is being retracted 
and include a complete citation reference to that article.” See 
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-issues/scientific 
misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html. 
 
5 For a current case (not in economics) see http://retractionwatch.com/2017/05/03/researcher-
sued-prevent-retractions-now-12/ 
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3. Method 
We analyse 55 articles retracted from 734 peer-reviewed journals in economics. 
These were the 316 economics journals listed in the field “ECON” [that is, 
“Economics, Econometrics and Statistics”] in the ABS academic journal guide 
(hereafter, ABS Guide) published in 2015 (accessible at 
https://charteredabs.org/academic-journal-guide-2015/); and 418 additional 
journals classified as “Economics” in the ABDC’s journal list published in 2016 
(http://www.abdc.edu.au/master-journal-list.php). The ABS Guide rates journals 
according to quality from 4* (highest) to 1. Combining both sources (converting ABDC 
rankings to the ABS ranking system)6 yields a journal list comprising 26 journals 
ranked 4* or 4; 94 ranked 3; 226 ranked 2; and 388 ranked 1. We do not explore 
hundreds of other non-listed journals, such as “pay for publication” journals 
and/or “predatory” journals with weak or non-existent review processes.7 Nor do 
we explore other modes of research dissemination in economics (such as book 
chapters, conference proceedings, and working papers).  
Using Google Scholar, we searched serially for the terms “retraction”, “retracted”, 
“withdrawn”, and “withdrawal” in each of the 734 economics journals of interest. This 
yielded 74 retracted (or withdrawn) journal articles. We excised 19 of these articles 
because they had not been retracted for engaging in QRPs (5 were retracted for 
unspecified reasons but were subsequently re-published; 11 were retracted because 
of “accidental duplication” of the article in the same journal; and 3 were retracted 
because of an “administrative error” (such as publishing a rejected article by 
                                           
6 An ADBC quality rating of A*, A, B, C is converted to an ABS quality rating of 4* or 4,3,2,1 respectively. 
 
7 We do not include journals whose publisher has “economic(s)” in their title and which appeared in 
Beall’s List of Predatory Publishers (updated to 23 January, 2017). These publishers include the Asian 
Economic and Social Society, The Economics and Social Development Organization, International 
Academy of Business and Economics, and the International Economics Development and Research 
Center. 
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mistake). Thus, we were left with 55 articles retracted from economics journals for 
engaging in QRPs.  
To cross-validate this database, we repeated our Google Scholar search for 
retractions using three other sources: the Web of Science database from Thomson 
(https://apps.webofknowledge.com); a database of retractions made available by 
Retraction Watch (http://retractiondatabase.org/RetractionSearch.aspx); and the list 
of articles identified on the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) plagiarism and 
research fraud website (https://plagiarism.repec.org/offenders.html). No additional 
retracted papers in the 734 economics journals of interest were identified.  
We examined statements announcing a retraction to identify the reason for 
retraction. We also identified the journals associated with “no reason” retractions, 
and reviewed the retraction policy guidance provided by publishers. 
Appendix A contains a compendium of key details of the 55 retracted papers 
identified. This compendium should be a valuable resource to those committed to 
exposing flawed research and avoiding its propagation. The data provided for each 
retracted paper include year retracted, year published, author(s), abridged title, 
journal, ranking, citations, and reason for retraction. The quality of the retracting 
journal is expressed in terms of Journal Impact Factor (JIF), quartile position in the 
Scimago Journal Rankings List, and (equivalent) ranking in the ABS Guide.  
We draw attention to tow ways in which our database under-reports the level of 
research malpractice. First, some articles known to contain malpractice have been 
retracted or otherwise compromised, but have not necessarily been labelled as such, 
and are difficult to identify. To our knowledge, there is no single exhaustive database 
from which to identify an article (including those in economics) as being 
compromised. This problem arises because of the failure of some journals to disclose 
the fact of retraction clearly. Second, the incidence of retraction contains an inherent 
bias. Search methods using Google Scholar depend on the Internet searchability of 
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journal databases. This searchability was neither reliable nor extensive until about 
2007, when the database of journals published on Science Direct became searchable 
using Google Scholar. This seems to account for why the preponderance of identified 
retractions occurred during or after 2007. However, by 2010, Google Scholar covered 
98-100% of academic journals from eight key databases (ACS, Emerald, ERIC, JSTOR, 
Oxford University, Project MUSE, SpringerLink, and University of Chicago) (Chen, 
2010).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Profile of Retracted Papers 
 
Table 2 summarised the 55 retracted articles in terms of time taken to retract, 
number of citations, and journal quality. 
 
Table 2 
Profile of Retracted Papers in Economics 
 
Time to 
Retract 
Citations ABS/AJG 
Ranking 
Scimago 
Quartile 
Journal Impact 
Factor 
Years n Range n Rank n Quartile n Factor n 
< 1 35 0 - 10 42 4* 1 Q1 11 0 - 0.99 39 
2 6 11 - 20 9 4 1 Q2 41 1 – 1.99 8 
3 11 21 - 30 2 3 12 Q3 1 2 – 2.99 2 
4 0 31 - 40 0 2 38 Q4 1 3 – 3.99 1 
5 2 41 - 50 0 1 3 Not known 1 4 – 4.99 0 
6 to 9 1 51 - 100 2     > 5 0 
≥10 0 > 100 0     Not Known  
 
5 
Total 55  55  55  55  55 
 
 
With one exception, all articles were retracted between 2001 and 2016. The majority 
of articles (64%) were retracted within a year of publication. In terms of influence, 26 
retracted articles had informed further research, as evidenced by a collective 377 
citations (according to Google Scholar). The remaining 29 retracted papers had no 
citations. However, this does not necessarily mean they had no effect on scholarly 
thinking. Fourteen retracted articles were published by journals ranked as 3 or above 
in the ABS Guide. Most retractions appeared in journals ranked as 2 (n=38). The 
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article with the most citations (81) was retracted in 2014 for plagiarism from Economic 
Modelling, seven years after publication. 
The highest ranked journal to retract a paper was the American Economic Review 
[AER] (rated 4* in the ABS Guide). An article by Kunce et al. (2002) was retracted in 
2007 by the second and third authors, Gerking and Morgan (see AER, 97(3), p. 
1032). These authors apologised because their data did not support the main 
premise of their 2002 article 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.97.3.1032). The title of their 
notice included the word “retraction.” The original article remains accessible in the 
AER (https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282802762024656) and is 
not identified as retracted on the AER webpage or anywhere in the document. 
Disconcertingly, seven articles involving research malpractice documented by 
RePEc have not been retracted and remain available for scholars to access, without 
any mention of concern about the malpractice on the journal’s website.8 This is 
surprising given the prominence of these journals in their field, as their ranking in 
parentheses (ABS/ABDC/Scimago) indicates: Applied Economics (2/B/Q2), 
Economic Modelling (2/A/Q2), Energy Economics (3/A*/Q1), Journal of Air Transport 
Management (-/-/Q2), Journal of Applied Statistics (-/-/Q3), and Kyklos (3/A/Q2). 
In line with rational crime theory, the deterrent effect of reputational damage to 
researchers for committing research malpractice is weakened by the inability to 
reliably identify retracted papers and to disclose reasons for retraction. Furthermore, 
failure to clearly watermark a retracted paper as having been retracted, or to remove 
it from a journal’s website, may lead other researchers to inadvertently continue to be 
influenced by its content, and continue to cite it. For example, an article published in 
                                           
8 These are Barros (2008), Barros and Peypoch (2008), Barros et al. (2011), Bassem (2014), Ramos 
(2001), Fernando and Ramos (1999), and Gottinger (1996). 
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Economic Modelling (https://plagiarism.repec.org/bassem.html) is cited at least 10 
times in peer reviewed journals (found using Google Scholar). Despite concerns over 
plagiarism, and an apology for such from the author (see the preceding website link), 
the article continues to be available.9  
 
Disclosure of Reasons for Retraction 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the reasons for retraction. The major reason for 
retraction was fake peer review. This occurred in 12 cases, all associated with Khalid 
Zaman.10 He co-authored 12 retracted articles in economics (all in Economic 
Modelling). These articles had 19 co-authors and 105 citations. Each retraction notice 
states that: 
… the Editor was misled into accepting this article based upon the positive advice 
of at least one faked reviewer report … submitted from a fictitious email account 
which was provided to the Editor by the corresponding author during the 
submission ... (for an example, see Economic Modelling 45, 2015, p. 288). 
The retraction statements identify Zaman as the culprit but exonerate his co- 
authors.  
As at 6 February 2017, Zaman had co-authored at least 213 published articles, 
19 of which had been retracted. This unusually high rate of publication for an 
assistant professor should have signalled that questionable short cuts had been 
                                           
9 The article is cited in the following journals: Social Indicators Research (2016), Quality & Quantity 
(twice 2016), Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management (2016), Economic Analysis and 
Policy (2016), South African Journal of Science (2016), International Journal of Business and Management 
(2015), Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services (2015), Management (2015), Iranian Journal of 
Economic Studies (2013). 
 
10 Zaman was dismissed from his post as assistant professor in the Department of Management 
Sciences, CONSATS Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad, Pakistan on January 23, 2015 
“on account of his involvement in fraudulent publications.” 
(http://ww3.comsats.edu.pk/ciitblogs/BlogsDetailsOuter.aspx?ArticleId=41879). 
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taken in the research process. To date, the retractions of papers co-authored by 
Zaman represent only about 9% of his voluminous output. The extent to which the 
problems that prompted the existing retractions continue to be present in Zaman’s 
other published papers is open to speculation. There is no reason to assume that all 
of his remaining papers are free of similar blemishes. Without a full investigation of 
Zaman’s output, it is likely that defective work by him will continue to be cited, and 
inappropriately influence other research.  
The ICMJE is quite clear on what to do with the corpus of published work of 
retracted authors: 
The validity of previous work by the author of a fraudulent paper cannot be 
assumed. Editors may ask the author’s institution to assure them of the validity 
of other work published in their journals, or they may retract it. If this is not done, 
editors may choose to publish an announcement expressing concern that the 
validity of previously published work is uncertain. 
(http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-
issues/scientific- misconduct-expressions-of-concern-and-retraction.html) 
 
In terms of rational crime theory, Zaman’s actions suggest that the deterrents in place 
to curb QRPs (such as the reputational damage arising from published retraction 
notifications combined with the probability of being apprehended) were considered 
sufficiently low compared to the benefits of committing research fraud. 
Table 3 
Reasons for Article Retraction 
Reason n % 
No reason 28 51 
No reason, at editor’s request 3  
No reason, at author’s request 2  
No reason, “author and/or editor” 23  
Fake peer review 12 22 
Plagiarism 7 13 
Self-plagiarism 4 7 
Flawed reasoning/analysis/conclusions 2 4 
Multiple submission 2 4 
Total 55 100 
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Disturbingly, 28 of the 55 retraction notices (in 18 separate journals) did not 
provide a reason for retraction. Of these, the highest frequency of “no reason” 
retraction occurred in Statistics and Probability Letters (n = 8) and the International 
Review of Law and Economics (n = 3), both published by Elsevier. In respect of 23 of 
these 28 retracted papers, it is unclear who instigated the retraction (editor alone, 
author alone, editor and author in concert). There is no further explanation provided, 
as the following example demonstrates: 
This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author(s) and/or editor. The 
Publisher apologizes for any inconvenience this may cause. (Journal of Economics 
and Business). 
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014861951500051X) 
 
In business and management, p-hacking and other QRPs are strongly implicated 
in retractions, although these are often ascribed to problems with data analysis 
(Author, 20XX). Thus, many such retractions make it clear that p-values have been 
reported incorrectly or inappropriate statistical tests have been used. However, 
allegations of malpractice are generally avoided, since (conveniently) the original raw 
data are usually reported by the authors to be unavailable for further analysis. The 
field of economics is unlikely to be completely free of problems arising from p-hacking. 
The extent of the problem is masked by the large number of retractions that offer no 
reason. 
Providing an ambiguous or vague retraction notice seems likely to diminish the 
deterrence of research malpractice by lowering the cost to the researcher of engaging 
in QRPs. Although some people might infer malpractice by the author, s/he has the 
option of plausible denial. It means that those guilty of research fraud may be able 
to continue academic work, retain papers in circulation that should justly be 
investigated, and publish further (possibly) fraudulent or defective work in the future. 
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The 28 “no reason” articles retracted within a year of publication, had generated 
46 citations on Google Scholar. With one exception, all “no reason” retractions were 
from a journal published by Elsevier. Generally, the level of observed “no reason” 
retractions (51%) is high in comparison to the level reported in business and 
management, where 10% of retraction notices gave “no reason” or “vague reasons” 
– such as mentioning “errors” in data analysis, but without explaining what these 
were (Author 20XX). The much higher rate of “no reason” retraction in economics may 
be due to the editors of economics journals being “more rational” and less willing to 
risk legal action from aggrieved authors.11 
The high volume of retractions from journals published by Elsevier is not reflected 
in the size of Elsevier’s market share – at least as proxied by the proportion of total 
economics journals it publishes that are represented in the ABS Guide and ABDC list 
(see Table 4). Whilst Elsevier’s market share is only 9.5%, it was responsible for 84% 
of the 55 retracted papers.12 Elsevier’s strong presence in our database of retracted 
articles may be attributable to its high level of proficiency in detecting QRPs; to it 
having more conscientious readers; and/or to the economics journals published by 
Elsevier being more prestigious, and thereby, attracting a high volume of papers 
containing QRPs. 
 
Table 4 
Economics Journals by Publisher 
 
                                           
11 Or perhaps, as a reader of an earlier version of this paper observed tartly, “editors of economics 
journals are prima donnas – and don’t see why they need to tell readers the reasons.” 
 
12 The overrepresentation of Elsevier contrasts with the situation reported by Author (20XX) for 
Business and Management. There, Elsevier published only about 20% of all retracted papers, and there 
was a more pronounced spread among other academic publishers (e.g., Taylor and Francis, SAGE, 
Springer). The leading publisher of retracted papers was a scholarly academy, the American Accounting 
Association. This was largely because a particularly prolific fraudster, James Hunton, an accounting 
professor, has had 37 papers retracted (http://retractionwatch.com/category/by-author/james-
hunton/). 
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Publisher n % 
Springer 93 12.7 
Wiley 85 11.6 
Elsevier 70 9.5 
Tayor & Francis 60 8.2 
De Gruyter 20 2.7 
Oxford University Press 20 2.7 
Sage 19 2.6 
Cambridge University Press 18 2.4 
Emerald 14 1.9 
InderScience 13 1.8 
Others: < 1% share each 322 43.9 
Total 734 100  
 
We explored whether the named publishers in Table 4 committed themselves to 
stating clear reasons for retracting an article. Clear policies on retraction, and 
rigorous enforcement of those policies, would increase the penalties for research 
malpractice, thereby reducing the incentive to engage in such conduct. Table 5 
reports the results of this further exploration.  
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Table 5 
 Publisher Policies on Stating Reasons for Retraction 
 
Publisher Source Policy on reasons for 
retraction 
Best Practice 
Guidelines Cited 
with Approbation 
Springer http://resource-
cms.springer.com/springer-
cms/rest/v1/content/19862/
data/v1/Pubslishing+Ethics+
Guide+for+Editors 
States clearly the need to 
comply with COPE “Retraction 
Guidelines.” These advise that 
retractions “should state the 
reason(s) for retraction (to 
distinguish misconduct from 
honest error).” 
COPE 
Wiley https://authorservices.wiley.c
om/asset/photos/Best-
Practice-Guidelines-on-
Publishing-Ethics-2ed.pdf 
 
The retraction notice “should 
enable the reader to identify 
and understand why the 
article is being retracted, or 
should explain the editor’s 
concerns about the contents of 
the article.” 
COPE and ICMJE 
Elsevier https://www.elsevier.com/abo
ut/our-
business/policies/article-
withdrawal 
 
No clear statement. ICMJE and National 
Library of Medicine. 
The latter states it 
“does not 
differentiate 
between articles 
that are retracted 
because of honest 
error and those that 
are retracted 
because of scientific 
misconduct or 
plagiarism.” 
Taylor 
and 
Francis 
http://authorservices.tayloran
dfrancis.com/custom/uploads
/2016/01/Author-services-
correction-policy.pdf 
 
“The rationale for a retraction 
will be given in a Statement of 
Retraction.” 
 
De 
Gruyter 
http://degruyteropen.com/yo
u/journal-author/editorial-
policies/other-stm/ 
 
“A Retraction Note detailing 
the reason for retraction will 
be linked to the original 
article.” 
COPE 
OUP https://academic.oup.com/jo
urnals/pages/authors/ethics 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
Sage https://au.sagepub.com/en-
gb/oce/manuscript-
submission-
guidelines%20#PublicationEth
ics 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
CUP https://www.cambridge.org/c
ore/about/ethical-standards 
 
No clear statement. COPE and ICMJE 
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Emerald http://www.emeraldgrouppubl
ishing.com/authors/writing/w
ithdrawal.htm 
and 
https://www.ifla.org/publicati
ons/iflaipa-joint-statement-
on-retraction-or-removal-of-
journal-articles-from-the-web 
 
Adheres to the principles 
outlined in the International 
Federation of Library 
Associations/International 
Publishers’ Association, A 
Joint Statement on "Retraction 
or Removal of Journal articles 
from the Web". 
U.S. National 
Library of Medicine 
guidelines at 
https://www.nlm.ni
h.gov/pubs/factshe
ets/errata.html 
Inder 
science 
http://www.inderscience.com
/papers/policies.php 
 
No accessible statement  
  
Most publishers stated no clear commitment to identify explicit reasons for 
retraction. This means that no reasons, vague reasons, or euphemisms are 
provided: that is, if any are provided at all. Several publishers refer with approbation 
to the COPE and ICMJE guidelines which require a statement of the reasons for 
retraction. But our analysis points to a low incidence of this occurring. For example, 
Wiley cites the COPE and ICMJE guidelines and states that a retraction notice 
“should enable the reader to identify and understand why the article is being 
retracted, or should explain the editor’s concerns about the contents of the article.” 
Nonetheless, it includes a diluting rider that ‘‘The COPE guidelines have no legal 
force and it is generally prudent to avoid ‘naming and shaming’ authors and simply 
to confirm a retraction, when necessary, in neutral and concise terms.” This stance 
seems inconsistent with the COPE (and ICMJE) guidelines which both advise that 
clear reasons be given for retraction.  
The lack of clarity regarding reason for retraction opens the possibility that some 
retractions arising from fabrication and falsification are attributed instead to 
“errors.” Such an outcome will spare the feelings of the authors involved, but reduce 
the disincentives to engage in malpractice by ensuring that perpetrators can 
continue with their research careers. Note that the National Library of Medicine 
(NLM) policy (cited approvingly by Elsevier), allows the practice of not differentiating 
“between articles that are retracted because of honest error and those that are 
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retracted because of scientific misconduct or plagiarism.” Overall, the publishers’ 
policy statements are insufficiently rigorous, often ambiguous, and often unclear 
about what actions to take in response to serious research-related offences. 
 
Remedies 
 
Endeavours to reduce the level of research malpractice in published research should 
seek to to reduce the benefits obtained from doing so, and increase the likely costs 
involved, consistent with rational crime theory. This could include the ambitious task 
of persuading universities to be less preoccupied with their ranking in various 
national and international league tables; to be less intense in their hyper-drives to 
“improve” research performance; and to commit to support a moratorium on 
awarding bonuses to academics for publishing in ( what are perceived to be) top 
journals (Chapman and Lindner, 2016). We suggest that while current priorities 
prevail, the problems discussed will intensify. In terms of costs, increasing the 
certainty of enforcement and the associated fine (or punishment) will help deter 
offenders. 
Publishers’ own commercial interests should prompt action on their part. The 
growing awareness of malpractice diminishes public confidence in the integrity of 
research. Publishers share in the problems this causes, since if the view that 
something is seriously awry gains momentum, then more questions will be asked 
about how publishers contribute positively to the publication process. At present, 
publishers can claim to be safeguarding quality by providing robust editorial support, 
and by eliminating poor work from journals. If that claim erodes, so does much of 
their unique selling point. People may be more insistent in asking whether the 
traditional model of journal publication has outlived its usefulness. On the other 
hand, if publishers are seen to take robust action against malpractice then they will 
put themselves in a stronger position to show that they add value. Below we make 
three specific proposals. 
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Proposal 1 
 
The publishing house responsible for the journal from which a paper is retracted for 
research malpractice (henceforth the “retracting publishing house”) should be 
required to collate an inventory of all journal articles and other scholarly works 
published by the retracted author. The retracting publishing house should then 
formally advise other publishing houses responsible for publishing the works 
identified in this inventory (henceforth the “affected publishing houses”) of the 
retraction. The affected publishing houses will have a duty to inform their relevant 
journal editors of the details of the retraction. They should require their editors to 
audit any paper they have approved for publication by the retracted author, with a 
view to identifying any research impropriety. Pending the completion of such an audit, 
the paper(s) under scrutiny should be flagged on the title page, within the bounds of 
legal etiquette, and contain a clear warning to readers of the possibility of impropriety. 
Affected publishing houses should also be required to inform the corresponding 
author of all papers which cite the retracted paper, of the paper’s retraction.  
Proposal 2 
 
All journals should be required to issue clear statements of the reasons for retraction, 
in accord with recommendations of COPE and ICMJE (referred to earlier). If this is 
not done, then journal home pages should remove any explicit statement or implicit 
suggestion of compliance with COPE and ICMJE (or similar) guidelines regarding 
ethical publishing. Simply stating who instigated a request for retraction is not 
helpful to the wider scholarly community. Such statements obscure the extent of 
malpractice and limit the possibility of others learning from errors that have 
occurred. 
Proposal 3 
 
The text of a retracted paper should not continue to be accessible. Otherwise, there 
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is a strong possibility that defective work will continue to be cited and influence 
scholarly thinking.13 All retracting publishing houses should ensure they remove 
the text of all retracted papers from journal web sites and other databases and 
search engines. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We have highlighted the paucity of information provided about the reasons for 
retracting articles from peer-reviewed journals in economics. The work of Retraction 
Watch, RePEc, and the authors cited in Table 1, go some way to tipping the balance. 
The results strongly suggest the need for economics journals to be much more 
explicit about the reasons for retraction. Two benefits would flow from this. First, 
there would be a much clearer indication of the level of retraction for unacceptable 
research practices, including data fraud, plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Second, it 
would be much clearer to researchers in economics that engaging in research 
malpractice is likely to harm their careers. This would increase the threat of 
reputational damage (a key attribute to deterring research malpractice in a rational 
crime framework) and reduce the influence of such articles in further research. 
The issues raised above are of fundamental importance. There is growing 
concern whether State funding for universities is money spent wisely and ethically 
(Goodstein, 2010). Each instance of unethical behaviour damages public trust in 
academic research at a time when such trust is vitally important. Yet the reward 
and incentive systems within academia seem perversely designed to encourage poor 
practice (Harris, 2017). This points to the likelihood that the problems discussed 
will remain, and possibly intensify. Nonetheless, there needs to be greater 
awareness of QRPs and their harmful effects. Action by multiple stakeholders is 
                                           
13 Bar-Ilan and Halevi (2017) studied fifteen papers retracted in 2014 that had been cited 267 times 
between January 2015 and March 2016. They found that 83% of these citations were positive. 
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required to increase the costs and reduce the benefits of these practices. The 
proposals made here are intended to stimulate debate and to prompt the academic 
community to move forward on these crucial issues.  
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 Appendix 
Retracted Articles from Economics Journals 
(arranged by year of retraction with some contractions to shorten “reason for retraction”) 
[Key: AJG = CABS Academic Journal Guide ranking; Anal. = Analysis; Econ. = Economic(s); Fin. = Finance; Int. = International; JIF = Journal Impact Factor; J. = Journal of; 
Prob. = Probability; SQ = Scimago Quartile; Stats. = Statistics; Rev. = Review; N = the journal does not have an impact factor, or is not listed by Scimago]  
Year 
retracted
/ Year 
published 
Author(s)  Abridged title Journal AJG/JIF/SQ / 
Citations 
Reason for retraction 
  
1 
2016/15 Goorha Sequencing ideas into 
innovations through 
pure thought 
Econ. Letters 3 / 0.5 / Q2 / 
1 
Plagiarism: “This article has been retracted at the request of the author 
following disclosure that data and text in the article had been copied from: 
Ivashchenko and Novikov (2006) Model of the Hierarchy of Needs, 
Automation and Remote Control, 67(9), 1512–1517” 
2 
2016/15 Rosenbaum Sensitivity analysis for 
average treatment 
effects in matched 
observational studies 
Biometrika 4 / 1.4 / Q1 / 
0 
No Reason: "This article has been retracted on the request of the author." 
3 
2016/16 Meinzer Social mobility in the 
early middle ages 
Explorations 
in Econ. 
History 
3 / N / Q1 / 0 No Reason: "The publisher regrets that this article has been temporarily 
removed. A replacement will appear as soon as possible in which the 
reason for removal … will be specified, or the article will be reinstated.” 
4 
2015/15 Page, Scott-
Clayton 
Improving college 
access in the United 
States 
Econ. of 
Education 
Rev. 
2 / 0.97 / Q1 / 
0 
No Reason: Cites the regret notice immediately above. The article was not 
reinstated but published under a similar title in 2016. No reason for 
removal has been found. 
5 
2015/15 Hagendorff  Governance & risk in 
banking 
J. Econ. & 
Business 
1 / N / Q2 / 0 No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor." 
6 
2015/15 Benoit Virtue of impatience 
when trading split 
orders  
Quarterly 
Rev. Econ. & 
Fin. 
2 / N / Q2 / 0 As immediately above. 
7 
2015/15 Zientara, 
Kujawski 
Polish employees’ 
intentions to migrate  
Int. Econ. & 
Econ. Policy 
2 / N / Q4 / 0 Self-plagiarism: "Upon request of the authors, this article is retracted 
because of substantial overlap with content published in [the title and 
authors of a journal article in the Polish language is provided]. 
8 
2015/15 Ortmann Experimental turn in 
Econ.  
J. Econ. 
Psychology 
3 / 1.23 / Q1 / 
0 
No reason: “This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor.” 
9 
2015/13 Wang How ICT penetration 
influences Productivity 
Growth 
Econ. Dev. 
Quarterly 
2/ 0.83 / Q2 / 
0 
Self-plagiarism: "The author requested the article be withdrawn after 
publication on Online First but prior to publication in the February 2015 
issue, informing the journal that the paper included the original dataset 
and excerpts from an earlier draft of the paper co-written by the author 
and colleagues.” 
10 
2015/13 Zaman, Khilji Relationship between 
growth & poverty in 
forecasting framework 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 4 
Fake peer review: "... the Editor was misled into accepting this article 
based upon the positive advice of at least one faked reviewer report … 
submitted from a fictitious email account … provided to the Editor by the 
corresponding author ... Dr Zaman wishes to admit sole responsibility and 
to state that his co-authors were not aware of his actions." 
 11 
2015/13 Bashir, Xu, 
Zaman, 
Akhmat, 
Ikram  
Impact of foreign 
political instability on 
Chinese exports 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 3 
As immediately above.  
12 
2015/13 Zaman, Khilji  The growth–
inequality–poverty 
triangle  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 9 
As immediately above.  
13 
2015/13 Salar, 
Zaman, Khilji 
Consequences of 
revenue gap  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 1 
As immediately above.  
14 
2015/13 Mudakkar, 
Uppal, 
Zaman, 
Naseem, 
Shah 
Foreign exchange risk 
in a managed float 
regime 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
15 
2015/13 Rustam, 
Rashid, 
Zaman 
Audit committees, 
compensation 
incentives & corporate 
audit fees  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 10 
As immediately above.  
16 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Khan, Ahmad 
Foreign direct 
investment & pro-poor 
growth policies  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 17 
As immediately above. 
17 
2015/12 Hassan, 
Zaman 
Effect of oil prices on 
trade balance  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 17 
As immediately above.  
18 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Izhar, Khan, 
Ahmad 
Financial indicators & 
human development  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 15 
As immediately above.  
19 
2015/12 Zaman, 
Khan, 
Ahmad, Khilji 
Agricultural 
technologies & carbon 
emissions  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 13 
As immediately above.  
20 
2015/12 Naz, Mohsin, 
Zaman 
Exchange rate pass-
through in to inflation 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 12 
As immediately above.  
21 
2015/12 Moshin, 
Zaman 
Distributional effects 
of rising food prices  
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 4 
As immediately above.  
22 
2014/14 Li, Shi Multidimensional 
BSDEs with uniformly 
continuous 
coefficients 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor." 
23 
2014/13 Gerasimou Equivalence of 
continuity & 
hemicontinuity for 
preference preorders 
J. 
Mathematical 
Econ. 
3 / 0.738 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
24 
2014/09 Maniar, 
Bhatt, 
Maniyar 
Expiration hour effect 
of futures & options 
markets  
Int. Rev. 
Econ. & Fin. 
2 / 1.704 / Q1 
/ 12 
Plagiarism: “This article has been retracted at the request of the Editor.” 
The authors have plagiarized part of a paper that had already appeared.” 
25 
2014/07 Zhang, Da, 
Wang  
Nonlinear duopoly 
game with 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 81 
Plagiarism: "This paper has been removed on the grounds of plagiarism. 
This case was investigated by the REPEC plagiarism committee and 
 heterogeneous players plagiarism was confirmed."  
26 
2013/13 Barczyk Kolodko, truth, errors, 
& lies  
Econ. 
Systems 
2 / 0.649 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above. 
27 
2013/11 Shin, Hwang Examining the factors 
affecting the rate of 
IPTV diffusion 
J. Media 
Econ. 
1 / 0.417 / Q2 
/ 7 
Self-plagiarism: “… data reported in this article was reproduced 
identically from data published in the following articles authored or co-
authored by Prof. Shin of Sungkyun kwan University, South Korea …” 
28 
2013/10 Baek, Park Convergence of 
weighted sums for 
arrays of negatively 
dependent random 
variables  
J. Stat. 
Planning & 
Inference 
2 / 0.675 / Q2 
/ 11 
Multiple submissions: "The article is a duplicate of a paper … already … 
published in the J. Theoretical Prob. (2010), 23: 362-377. One of the 
conditions of submission … is that authors declare explicitly that the 
paper is not under consideration for publication elsewhere … apologies are 
offered to readers of the journal that this was not detected during the 
submission process. As a sanction, J. Theoretical Probability will not allow 
the authors … to participate in the journal in any way until Jan. 1, 2018." 
29 
2012/12 Rosoi Financial integration 
& international 
transmission of 
business cycles 
Applied 
Econ. Letters 
1 / 0.303 / Q3 
/ 0 
Plagiarism: "This article substantially reproduced the content of … 
Fidrmuc, Iwatsubo and Ikeda, Financial integration and international 
transmission of business cycles … Discussion Papers 1007, Graduate 
School of Economics, Kobe University, 2010." 
30 
2012/12 Fei, Liu Stochastic set 
differential equations  
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
31 
2012/12 Batabyal, 
Nijkamp 
A Schumpeterian 
model of 
entrepreneurship, 
innovation, & regional 
economic growth 
Int. Regional 
Science Rev. 
2 / 1.18 / N / 
18 
No Reason 
32 
2012/11 Zulkhibri Corporate financing 
choices & monetary 
policy  
Econ. 
Systems 
2 / 0.649 / Q2 
/ 0 
No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor." 
33 
2011/11 Cheng, 
Zhang  
Pricing American 
options analytically 
J. Econ. 
Dynamics & 
Control 
3 / 1.018 / Q2 
/ 2 
As immediately above. 
34 
2011/10 Lau More powerful non-
linear panel unit root 
test & its application 
Econ. 
Modelling 
2 / 0.827 / Q2 
/ 0 
No Reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor.” 
35 
2010/10 Gervini Functional singular 
value decomposition 
for bivariate stochastic 
processes 
Computation
al Stats & 
Data Anal. 
3 / 1.4 / Q1 / 
0 
Multiple submissions: "This article was submitted on January 26, 2009 
to Computational Stats & Data Anal. (CSDA) and … was submitted on 
January 27, 2009 to J. Multivariate Anal. (JMVA). The paper was rejected 
by JMVA and after two revisions it was accepted by CSDA in July 2009. 
On November 17, 2009, the Editor-in-Chief was notified … that … the 
paper was submitted to two journals around the same time … the author 
indicated that he submitted it to two journals (JMVA and CSDA) to ensure 
prompt publication. One of the conditions of submission … is that authors 
declare explicitly that the paper is not under consideration for publication 
elsewhere. As such this article represents a severe abuse of the scientific 
publishing system." 
36 
2010/09 Mehrara Effects of oil price 
shocks on industrial 
production 
Energy Econ. 3 / 2.708 / Q1 
/ 0 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the author." 
 37 
2010/09 Chong, 
Guillen, 
Lopez‐de‐
Silanes 
Corporate governance 
reform & firm value in 
Mexico 
J. Econ. 
Policy Reform 
2 / 0.86 / Q2 / 
22 
Self-plagiarism: "This article substantially reproduced the content of a 
book chapter edited by Chong and Lopez‐de‐Silanes. Corporate 
Governance and Firm Value in Mexico … published in …, a co‐publication 
of Stanford University Press, the World Bank and the Inter‐American 
Development Bank, … in 2007." 
38 
2010/08 Hahn Convergence of 
fictitious play in 
games with strategic 
complementarities 
Econ. Letters 3 / 0.51 / Q2 / 
5 
Flawed reasoning/analysis: "Because of an error discovered by Berger, 
Hahn is retracting his letter. The paper claims to prove that a strategy-
adjustment process called ‘fictitious play’ converges to an equilibrium in 
games with strategic complementarities. However, as shown by Berger, the 
proof of convergence is flawed." 
39 
2009/09 Wei, Li Ecological value at 
risk 
Ecological 
Econ. 
3 / 2.72 / Q1 / 
4 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor." 
40 
2009/09 Noailly,  
Nahuis 
Entry & competition in 
the Dutch notary 
profession 
Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2 / 0.339 / Q2 
/ 0 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the editor." 
41 
2009/09 Wagner Legal uncertainty  Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2 / 0.339 / Q2 
/ 0 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier 
Policy on Article Withdrawal 
(http://www.elsevier.com/locate/withdrawalpolicy).” 
42 
2009/07 Nofsinger Social mood J. Behavioral 
& 
Experimental 
Econ. 
(formerly J. 
Socio-Econ.) 
2 / 0.34 / Q2 / 
14 
Plagiarism: "The editor greatly regrets the misrepresentation of 
authorship … Dr. Nofsinger's version derived its thesis and substantially 
its content from a pre-existing discussion paper by Prechter, Goel and 
Parker that he reviewed prior to producing his iteration. Contrary to the 
publisher's policy on originality and plagiarism, Dr. Nofsinger's 
submission failed to cite the earlier work. Dr. Nofsinger has agreed to 
retract his paper." 
43 
2008/08 Djankov A response to “Is doing 
business damaging 
business?” 
J. 
Comparative 
Econ. 
3 / 1.17 / Q2 / 
22 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier 
Policy on Article Withdrawal" 
44 
2008/08 Fukuyama, 
Neupane 
Convergence of 
weighted averages of 
pairwise independent 
random variables 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier 
Policy on Article Withdrawal." 
45 
2008/07 Said, 
Wegman, 
Sharabati, 
Rigsby  
Social networks of 
author–co-author 
relationships 
Computation
al Stats & 
Data Anal. 
3 / 1.4 / Q1 / 
62 
Plagiarism: "This article … contain[s] portions of other authors' writings 
on the same topic in other publications, without sufficient attribution ... 
The principal authors … acknowledged that text from background sources 
was mistakenly used in the Introduction without proper reference to the 
original source." 
46 
2007/02 Kunce, 
Gerking, 
Morgan 
Effects of 
environmental & land 
use regulation in the 
oil & gas industry  
American 
Econ. Rev. 
4* / 3.673 / 
Q1 / 5 
Incorrect conclusion: "Findings presented in the original paper cannot be 
substantiated because the data furnished by IHS Energy Group cannot be 
used to identify differences between drilling costs on lands under different 
ownership." 
47 
2007/07 Ullrich Inflation expectations 
of experts & ECB 
communication 
North 
American J. 
Econ. & Fin. 
2 / N / Q2 / 0 No reason: "This article has been withdrawn consistent with Elsevier 
Policy on Article Withdrawal." 
48 
2007/07 Meintanis  Exponentiality against 
non-parametric family 
of life distributions 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
 49 
2007/07 Lanconelli Mehler's formula & 
Jensen's inequality  
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
50 
2005/05 Cooter, Raja, 
Schäfer 
Intro to workshop on 
law & econ. devp.  
Int. Rev. Law 
& Econ. 
2 / 0.339 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above.  
51 
2005/05 Meerschaert  Norming operators for 
generalized domains of 
attraction 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
No reason: "This article has been withdrawn at the request of the 
author(s) and/or editor." 
52 
2005/04 Pingyan, 
Shixin  
Complete convergence 
for arrays 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above. 
53 
2004/04 Sheena On unbiasedness of 
invariant tests of 
sphericity 
J. 
Multivariate 
Anal. 
3 / 0.934 / Q1 
/ 0 
As immediately above. 
54 
2001/01 Furstenberg, 
Kaga  
Linear regression & 
second moments 
Stats & Prob. 
Letters 
2 / 0.595 / Q2 
/ 0 
As immediately above. 
55 
1982/81 Nath, Enns  Optimal service rates 
in the multiserver loss 
system  
J. Applied 
Prob. 
2 / 0.586 / Q2 
/ 6 
Plagiarism: "... This paper is almost identical in form and content to that 
published by Tahara and Nishida … in the J. of the Operations Research 
Society of Japan, 18, 1975, 90-96." 
 
